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The Java campaign of 1806–1807 was a minor campaign during the Napoleonic Wars by British Royal Navy forces against a naval squadron of the Kingdom of Holland, a client state of the French Empire, based on the island of Java in the Dutch East Indies. Seeking to eliminate any threat to valuable British merchant convoys passing through the Malacca Straits, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew determined in early 1806 that the Dutch naval forces based at Java, which included several ships of the line and three frigates, had to be defeated to ensure British dominance in the region. Lacking the forces to effect an invasion of the Dutch colony, Pellew instead sought to isolate and blockade the Dutch squadron based at Batavia in preparation for raids specifically targeting the Dutch ships with his main force. Although his plans were delayed by inadequate resources and the Vellore Mutiny in India, Pellew sent the frigate to the Java Sea in July 1806. ''Greyhound'' intercepted and defeated a Dutch convoy off the coast of Sulawesi on 25 July and three months later the frigate managed to capture the Dutch frigate at the entrance to Batavia harbour. Following these successes, Pellew was able to bring his main force to bear on the island and in November 1806 launched a major raid on Batavia, destroying the remaining frigate and a number of minor warships from the Dutch squadron. The Dutch ships of the line had escaped prior to Pellew's attack to the harbour of Griessie near Surabaya, and although they were old and in a poor state of repair Pellew was forced to lead a second operation to Java in October 1807, capturing the port and eliminating the last Dutch naval forces in the east. The victory gave Britain dominance over its European rivals in the eastern Pacific and western Indian Ocean, allowing free passage of British trade through the region and allowing British forces to focus on the one remaining threat to their merchant convoys in the Indian Ocean: the French islands of Île Bonaparte and Isle de France (now Mauritius). ==Background== At the start of 1806, control of the Indian Ocean in the Napoleonic Wars was disputed. The French Empire and its client state the Kingdom of Holland held significant naval bases in the region, from which their warships could operate against British interests. The French islands of Île Bonaparte and Isle de France dominated the central Indian Ocean, their position allowing raiders to cruise British trade routes and attack isolated convoys, while the Dutch colonies at the Cape of Good Hope and the Dutch East Indies controlled the points of entry to the ocean from east and west with their own naval squadrons.〔Adkins, p. 183〕〔Gardiner, p. 93〕 The British, whose bases in India gave them control of the Northern Indian Ocean, were able to obtain supplies and reinforcements from Europe more easily than their enemies, as the Royal Navy was already dominant in European waters, but British forces in the region were still insufficient to make a significant impact on the French and Dutch territories.〔Gardiner, p. 59〕 Control of the Indian Ocean was essential for the British war effort, because the British economy relied heavily on trade with the holdings of the Honourable East India Company in India and with other ports in the east, particularly in China.〔Adkins, p. 342〕 In 1803 at the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars, a French squadron under Rear-Admiral Charles Linois was already operating in the Indian Ocean against British commerce, initially based at Isle de France.〔James, Vol. 3, p. 212〕 Linois's principal target was the China Fleet, a large annual convoy of valuable East Indiamen merchant ships and smaller "country ships" that sailed from Canton early in the year and crossed the Indian Ocean to the Cape of Good Hope, then passing northwards to Europe. In 1804, this convoy was worth over £8 million and included 29 ships which—due to the sudden news of the outbreak of war—were entirely unprotected by the Royal Navy during the first leg of its journey across the South China Sea.〔Woodman, p. 194〕 Although Linois was not aware of the weakness of the convoy’s defences, he knew of its importance and value and determined to intercept it, using Batavia on the island of Java as his main base. Ultimately Linois failed to defeat the convoy, withdrawing after some initial skirmishing at the Battle of Pulo Aura, but the importance of Batavia as a base against British shipping was confirmed.〔Clowes, p. 338〕 The British commander in the Indian Ocean, Rear-Admiral Peter Rainier, was preoccupied with protecting merchant shipping off India during 1804 and 1805 to be able to risk an expedition to the Java Sea. His successor, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew was distracted by the continued operations of Linois's squadron and attacks from frigates based at Isle de France to take any action against the Dutch before the beginning of the monsoon season at the end of 1805, at which point the threat posed by hurricanes prevented any major seabourne operations. However by early 1806, the departure of Linois into the Atlantic Ocean allowed Pellew and his squadron in Madras to consider offensive operations against enemy harbours.〔 In addition to the threat from cruising French squadrons, the Dutch maintained their own force on Java, under Rear-Admiral Hartsinck at Batavia. This squadron—which consisted of four ships of the line, three frigates and a number of smaller warships—was principally tasked with anti-piracy operations, but their presence so close to the Malacca Straits was a source of concern to the British command in India.〔 Control of the Indian Ocean was essential for the British war effort, because the British economy relied heavily on trade with the holdings of the Honourable East India Company in India and with other ports in the east, particularly in China.() 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Java campaign of 1806–07」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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